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INTRODUCTION
The number of public corporations in the United States has been in
decline for almost twenty years. Alternative forms of organization, from
LLCs and benefit corporations to Linux and Wikipedia, provide robust
competition to traditional corporations, while short-lived, project-based
enterprises that assemble supply chains from available parts are increasingly cost effective. Yet our understanding of corporate governance has
not kept pace with the new organization of the economy and we continue
to treat the public corporation with dispersed ownership as the default
form of doing business. Meanwhile, many of the corporations going public in recent years have abandoned traditional standards of corporate
governance and give their founders extraordinary voting shares that effectively guarantee their control in perpetuity. The public corporation
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seems to be an increasingly anachronistic form of enterprise in the United States.1
Nikefication turned the corporation into a nexus-of-contracts, organizationally separating design from production and distribution.2 Entrepreneurs grew skilled at assembling contractors into a virtual enterprise. More recently we have seen Uberization, which allows on-demand
labor to be contracted by the task via online platforms. Uberization
threatens to turn jobs into tasks, to the detriment of labor. Every input
into the enterprise becomes possible to rent rather than to buy, and employee-free organizations are increasingly feasible. Enterprises increasingly resemble a web page, a set of calls on resources that are assembled
on demand to create a coherent performance.
In Part I of this Article, I first summarize evidence on the declining
number of public corporations in the United States and suggest that it is
not regulations that are responsible but the changing nature of production. I also summarize some of the atavistic governance practices of recent IPOs and predict that they will not survive long. In Part II, I describe
how Jensen and Meckling’s contentious 1976 article came to prominence
and ultimately provided a rationale for Nikefication. In Part III, I describe how Uberization—making labor inputs available on demand—
removes one of the last remaining rationales for the corporation, and indicates that it may usher in a new dark era for labor.
I. THE VANISHING PUBLIC CORPORATION
Public corporations have been vanishing in the United States since
the turn of the twenty-first century. The number of American corporations listed on U.S. stock markets dropped by fifty-five percent between
1997 and 2012.3 With about 4,000 companies left, American markets are
at the lowest number of listings in decades, while India surpassed the
United States in listings in 2003.4 In the past several years, we have seen
the disappearance from the markets of corporations in nearly every industry, from electronics to retail to investment banking. Some of the de1. The arguments in this section are fully documented in GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING
AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY (forthcoming May
2016).
2. Nike pioneered a model of designing and marketing athletic shoes by contracting out production to suppliers in East Asia. “Nikefication” describes the widespread adoption of this model.
3. See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV 1121, 1130–35 (2011).
4. World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators (for “Country”, select “India” or “United States”
; then for “Series”, select “Listed domestic companies, total”) (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
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cline in numbers is due to industry consolidation, as in banking, but
much is due to bankruptcies and liquidations (e.g., Enron, WorldCom,
Lehman Brothers, Circuit City, Eastman Kodak) and “going private”
transactions. Some eventually list their shares again on the stock market,
but most do not. This is a long-term secular shift in the nature of corporate capitalism in the United States.
The established corporations that remain are splitting up and buying
back their own stock at an impressive rate. Announced split-ups in recent
years include Hewlett-Packard’s plan to split in two; eBay’s divestiture
of Skype and PayPal; Time Warner’s separation of its publishing, media,
and cable businesses; Alcoa’s announced bifurcation; and GE’s wholesale abandonment of finance, once its largest source of profit.5 These
companies and their peers have been buying back their shares in bulk.
The 100 largest members of the S&P 500 bought back roughly $1 trillion
of their own shares between 2008 and 2013.6 Due to share buybacks,
IBM’s shares outstanding dropped from 2.3 billion in 1993 to 1.1 billion
twenty years later; one commentator noted that at this rate, IBM will
have no shares left by 2034.7 Presumably, these firms find shrinking their
share bases to be a better investment than researching new products or
investing in new plants and equipment. Perhaps they know something we
do not.
While the biggest corporations are disappearing, splitting up, and
buying back shares, they are not being replaced by new entrants. The
going public fad of the 1990s is now long gone. It has been almost twenty years since the peak of the 1990s IPO wave, but there is no reason to
expect a revival. There were fewer IPOs in the six years from 2009 to
2014 than there were in 1996 alone.8 Although some in the venture capital community would blame the IPO drought since 2000 on
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, or other manifestations of an intrusive

5. See David Gelles, Breaking Up Is the New Thing to Do in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
6, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/breaking-up-is-the-new-thing-to-do/;
Leslie Picker, Alcoa to Split Into 2 Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/dealbook/alcoa-to-split-into-2-separatecompanies.html; James B. Stewart, Do-It-All Era Ending as G.E. Returns to Core, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/business/dealbook/do-it-all-era-ending-as-gereturns-to-core.html.
6. Dennis K. Berman, Does IBM Love or Hate Itself?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304027204579334081811064124.
7. Id.
8. See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS (Aug. 26, 2015),
available at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/09/IPOs2014Statistics.pdf.
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nanny state,9 they would be wrong. The number of listed companies began to decline several years before the dot-com collapse. Even the JOBS
Act of 2012, which greatly reduced the regulatory hurdles for small firms
going public, has had only a trivial impact on the number of IPOs.10
So-called unicorns (companies privately valued at $1 billion or more) are
staying private in spite of a booming market. Going public seems to have
lost its appeal.11
The few companies that are going public often ignore the most
basic standards of corporate governance—such as one share/one vote—
and their long-term staying power is open to question. The eighty-four
companies listed in Table 1 all went public since 2010 with dual-class
voting rights that gave the founders great control relative to their financial stake in the company. Groupon, for instance, awarded its founders
150 votes per share when it went public, while Zynga’s founder Marcus
Pincus controls 70 votes per share.12 Under these circumstances, corporate control is effectively not contestable by outsiders or minority shareholders.

9. Timothy B. Lee, The IPO Is Dying. Marc Andreessen Explains Why, VOX (June 26, 2014),
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/26/5837638/the-ipo-is-dying-marc-andreessen-explains-why.
10. See, e.g., Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew Gustafson, The JOBS Act and
IPO Volume: Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459591.
11. See RITTER, supra note 8.
12. Randall Smith, One Share, One Vote?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970203911804576653591322367506.
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Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Groupon

Constellium NV

Crude Carriers Corp.

Manning & Napier

RCS Capital Corp.

MaxLinear Inc.

Zynga

Coty Inc.

First Interstate BancSystem Inc.

Renewable Energy Group

Truett-Hurst Inc.

DynaVox Inc.

Yelp

Luxoft Holding Inc.

PAA Natural Gas Storage LP

Vantiv

Silvercrest Asset Management

S&W Seed Co.

Digital Cinema Destinations

Noodles & Co.

Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC

Edgen Group Inc.

NRG Yield Inc.

Oxford Resource Partners LP

The Carlyle Group LP

UCP Inc.

Ameresco Inc.

Tilly’s Inc.

Jones Energy Inc.

Green Dot Corp.

Facebook Inc.

Intrexon Corp.

Chesapeake Midstream Ptrs. LP

KAYAK Software Corp.

Pattern Energy Group

Rhino Resource Partners LP

Globus Medical Inc.

Premier Inc.

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Co.

Manchester United PLC

RingCentral

FXCM Inc.

Workday Inc.

RE/MAX Holdings

Swift Transportation Co.

Seadrill Partners LLC

LDR Holding

Adecoagro SA

The WhiteWave Foods Co.

Veeva Systems

MagnaChip Semiconductor

Restoration Hardware Hldg Inc.

JGWPT Holdings LLC

Apollo Global Management

PBF Energy Inc.

Zulily

GNC Holdings

Zoetis Inc.

AMC Entertainment Holdings

TMS International

Health Ins Innovations Inc.

EP Energy Corp.

Arcos Dorados Holdings

Artisan Partners Asset Mgmt Inc.

Malibu Boats

Box Ships Inc.

Taylor Morrison Home Corp.

uniQure BV

Air Lease Corp.

Fairway Group Holdings Corp.

Ladder Capital

LinkedIn Corp.

Blackhawk Network Holdings Inc.

Lumenis Ltd.

Yandex NV

PennyMac Finl Svcs Inc.

Castlight Health Inc.

KiOR

William Lyon Homes Inc.

Phibro Animal Health Corp.

Zillow

Tableau Software Inc.

Moelis & Co LLC

Table 1: Firms going public with unequal voting rights since 201013
Dual-class voting rights have a long history and some famous practitioners, including Ford Motor Company (which went public in 1956
with two classes of shares, one giving the Ford family forty percent of
13. This table was created from data contained in the linked Excel spreadsheet at IPOs from
1980
–
April
2014
with
Multiple
Share
Classes
Outstanding,
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/06/dual-class-ipo.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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the votes with only five percent of the shares) and Nike (which gives
founder Philip Knight additional votes and guaranteed seats on the board
of directors).14 But dual-class capitalization has traditionally been most
common in the newspaper industry, where family-controlled businesses
such as the New York Times and Dow Jones sought to avoid pressures
from investors to trade journalistic integrity for profit. Since Google
went public in 2003, giving the two founders and CEO Eric Schmidt an
absolute majority of the voting rights, the practice has become common
in Silicon Valley.
Consider the IPO prospectus of Facebook, dated February 1, 2012.
Under “Use of Proceeds,” it states: “[W]e do not currently have any specific uses of the net proceeds planned. . . . Pending other uses, we intend
to invest the proceeds to us in investment-grade, interest-bearing securities . . . or hold as cash.”15 It later notes:
Because we qualify as a “controlled company” under the corporate
governance rules for publicly-listed companies, we are not required
to have a majority of our board of directors be independent, nor are
we required to have a compensation committee or an independent
nominating function. In light of our status as a controlled company,
our board of directors has determined not to have an independent
nominating function and has chosen to have the full board of directors be directly responsible for nominating members of our board,
and in the future we could elect not to have a majority of our board
of directors be independent or not to have a compensation committee.16

In short, one twenty-eight-year-old college dropout, holding an absolute majority of the voting shares, would have ultimate control for the
foreseeable future. He might, for instance, make $20 billion acquisitions
without consulting the board of directors.
It is somewhat surprising that after three decades of shareholder activism and governance reform, startups in Silicon Valley—America’s
hotbed of investor-fueled innovation—have chosen to abandon good
governance en masse and to adopt shareholder-hostile voting structures.
One possibility is that young technology firms are going into the markets
wearing armor to protect themselves from Wall Street’s myopia so that
they can make long-term investments and create jobs. But while the
14. DAVIS, supra note 1.
15. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR FACEBOOK, INC.
34 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/
d287954ds1.htm.
16. Id. at 31.
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“creative” part of creative destruction occasionally generates shareholder
value (at this writing, Facebook is valued at roughly one-quarter trillion
dollars, in spite of having revenues of only $12.5 billion in 2014),17 it
almost never creates actual full-time employment.
At this writing, the number of employees at ten of the most highly
visible technology companies to go public since the Great Recession are
modest, to say the least: Zynga (1,974 employees); LinkedIn (6,897);
Groupon (3,525 in North America); Zillow (1,215); Yelp (2,711); Facebook (9,199); Tableau (1,947); Zulilly (2,907); and Box (1,158) collectively employed 31,533 persons.18 For comparison purposes, Circuit City
fired roughly 34,000 employees when it was liquidated in January
2009.19 Almost no one actually works at the companies that go public,
and these firms hire relatively few new people each year, even at the behemoths. Google adds roughly 5,000 net new jobs per year, Facebook
about 1,200.20 (Notably, in 2013 only seven of Facebook’s 1,200 new
hires were black, which points to another one of Silicon Valley’s issues.)21
The simplest explanation for the declining prevalence of public
corporations is not regulation but transaction costs. In his 1937 article
The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase noted that using free markets was
not free. Coase wrote, “The main reason why it is profitable to establish
a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.
The most obvious cost of ‘organising’ production through the price
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.”22 When
the cost of using the price mechanism goes down—for instance, because
it is possible to find multiple bidders for many essential tasks on the
Web; many of the tools of organizing are available free or cheap online;
and labor can be “rented” through temps and contractors—then the
tradeoffs that once favored corporations begin to tilt in favor of alternative ways of organizing, such as privately financed LLCs.

17. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: FACEBOOK, INC. 32 (2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680115000006/fb-12312014x10k.htm.
18. Figures on employment from company 10-K filings available at EDGAR: Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2015).
19. Circuit City to Liquidate Remaining U.S. Stores, MSNBC (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28691963/ns/business-us_business/.
20. Id.
21. Rupert Neate, Facebook Only Hired Seven Black People in Latest Diversity Count,
GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/25/facebookdiversity-report-black-white-women-employees.
22. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937).
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The public corporation, in short, may be reaching its twilight in the
United States, a speculative point I initially made in a 2011 Seattle University Law Review article that now seems to be coming true.23
II. NIKEFICATION AND THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS
It is worth detailing why the public corporation is in decline in the
United States. I would start with a forty-year-old article that helped
change the discourse about what the corporation was, from a social institution to a mere nexus-of-contracts. Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, is one of the most widely cited publications in economics in
the past half-century.24 Google Scholar attributes over 50,000 citations to
this piece, putting it at the top of the field. Yet it is largely unread by
economists outside of finance. Why is that?
This new theory of the firm was counterintuitive, contentious, and
massively influential among law and business scholars. But there is
something odd about a finance-based approach becoming dominant as a
“theory of the firm.” Anyone who has taken introductory microeconomics might surmise that the most important question about firms is how
they set prices and volumes. Industrial economists might argue that market share and market power were important for consumer welfare. Labor
economists might imagine that firms’ roles as employers merited some
interest.
The idea that the most important thing about a firm is how stock
ownership by its managers aligns incentives with share price is surprising, to put it mildly. Only a tiny proportion of companies list on stock
markets, and only a small fraction of those (mostly in the United States)
have dispersed ownership. This was a theory about something that almost never happened in nature. A theory of family life would not want to
start with the Kardashians; why would a theory of the firm start with
managerialist American corporations? Moreover, how is it that a pair of
financial economists at the University of Rochester business school, writing in Volume 3 of an anonymous journal published by the University of
Rochester business school—which was edited by one of the authors!—
managed to create a dominant paradigm for the corporation for the next
thirty years? It was as if a self-published novel won its author the Nobel
Prize.
23. See Davis, supra note 3.
24. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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One might argue that Jensen and Meckling’s influence derived not
from creating a well-specified, falsifiable, broadly applicable empirical
theory, but because they provided a quasi-scientific rationale for deinstitutionalizing the corporation. For decades, scholars had argued about
the social responsibilities of corporations and likened them to nationstates with relatively inviolable boundaries. Corporate managers had to
trade off the interests of various “stakeholders,” and shareholders were
only one constituency among many. Jensen and Meckling argued that
this was wrong on both counts. The corporation was nothing but a nexusof-contracts that existed to create shareholder value:
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply
legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.
. . . Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts)
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.25

A firm is like a market and should not be confused with an actor
having goals, motivations, or personality. Through a puff of logical
smoke, the traditional view of the corporation dissipates, and questions
that animated some theorists (such as where a firm should place its
boundaries) disappear (firms don’t have boundaries—next question). We
could now get down to the business of reorganizing the corporate sector
to create shareholder value, guided by efficient capital markets.
Jensen and Meckling’s most enduring contribution is their metaphor of the corporation as a mere nexus-of-contracts. At the time that
they wrote, this idea was preposterous. General Motors and AT&T had
almost one million employees each, with seasoned workforces laboring
in vast and highly tangible facilities. Corporations were quite obviously
social institutions, and their employees were like citizens who received
health care for themselves and their dependents, stable compensation,
and pensions upon retirement. Denying that GM was a social institution
was like denying that Canada was a country. But the “nexus” imagery
served as a useful provocation, a lever to bust up the unwieldy and
shareholder-hostile conglomerates built up over the prior decades. This
was a theory perfectly designed to legitimate a bust-up takeover wave.
25. Id. at 310–11 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
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Most large corporations had grown diversified during the 1960s and
1970s, sometimes operating in dozens of unrelated industries (e.g., ITT,
LTV, Gulf & Western). Such firms were systematically undervalued by
the stock market compared to more focused firms, yet their status as social institutions protected them from being reorganized by outside buyers. Tearing apart a social institution hardly sounds like a “tender offer”
at all. Shifting a few contractual ties, on the other hand, seems harmless.
After the Supreme Court’s Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision in 1982
struck down state-level antitakeover laws,26 and the Justice Department
relaxed its stance on intra-industry mergers, the conglomerate’s days
were numbered. Twenty-eight percent of the Fortune 500 received takeover bids in the 1980s, and these battles for control were generally successful at splitting up diversified firms.27 Those that were not taken over
often voluntarily restructured, leaving American industry far more industrially focused by 1990.28 Moreover, corporate boundaries were no longer sacrosanct, and a consensus was emerging that corporations existed
primarily to create shareholder value.
The nexus metaphor became ever more apt during the 1990s, when
the advent of the Web made it easier to outsource on a grand scale. At
first, firms contracted out peripheral activities like managing the payroll.
Later, even the most central aspects of the business were eligible for outsourcing. China’s growth as a manufacturing powerhouse made it feasible to outsource many of the lower-value-added tasks of production.
Outsourcing firms ultimately came to encompass full-scale assembly and
supplier management. The Web made the make-or-buy decision subject
to continuous revision because prices were readily available. In combination, access to competing vendors in China and elsewhere over the Web
made outsourcing irresistible for many corporations.
The ability to create an enterprise out of already-existing parts,
without having to build them from scratch, enabled a disintegrated form
of organization. Nike had demonstrated that design and production could
be organizationally separated. The company doing the designing and
marketing could be in Oregon, while other companies in China or Indonesia or Vietnam could handle manufacturing, and still other companies
could manage distribution. This was “Nikefication,” a new model of
post-industrial organization. And if it worked for sneakers, why not
26. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
27. See Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann & Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline and Fall
of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59
AM. SOC. REV. 547, 548 (1994).
28. Id. at 562.
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computers, or blood thinner, or “enhanced interrogations” of prisoners in
Iraq?
In the intervening years, Nikefication has become pervasive. Almost the entire electronics industry was outsourced during the late 1990s
and early 2000s, as U.S. employment in computers and electronics declined by forty percent.29 As practices of outsourcing became widely
adopted, corporations came to look more and more like the nexus-ofcontracts described by the financial economists, with the parts snapped
together on a temporary basis like interlocking plastic blocks. The ready
availability of outside contractors made hiring actual employees largely
unnecessary and enabled the contemporary Silicon Valley model.
III. FROM NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS TO THE WEB PAGE ENTERPRISE
Widespread Nikefication has led to a vast reshuffling of organizational and industrial boundaries in the United States. Surprisingly few
things that Americans buy today are actually produced by the company
that manages the brand. Moreover, advances in computing power and
telecommunications have radically reorganized work processes inside
organizations. Tasks that are not currently outsourced can be controlled
by algorithms and “workforce management systems,” which have been
widely implemented across the retail, wholesale, and food service sectors. Today’s shopping malls and chain restaurants are high-tech successors to the assembly line, with GPS-enabled time-and-motion studies
optimizing human capital deployment at every moment. Line management is unnecessary when the performance of every worker at every
store at every moment is available to headquarters staff back at the Panopticon. Drones at HQ can push messages to your terminal or headset to
let you know that you are not scanning SKUs fast enough; you failed to
upsell that customer on the silk scarf; your last table gave you only three
smiley faces on their embedded iPad; or you are only grabbing seventy
items per hour at the warehouse temp job when your quota is 110.
We have turned the tasks of organization design and management
over to programmers. Hiring, scheduling, performance measurement, and
evaluation are now largely in the hands of algorithms written by people
who may have no personal experience of the jobs they are designing.
Things are about to get worse, at least from the perspective of labor.
The next stage in this evolution after Nikefication is Uberization: renting
labor for specific tasks rather than hiring for jobs. Business authors in the
1990s published many tomes on the “death of the career,” arguing that
29. Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 283, 288 fig.1 (2013).
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companies no longer valued long-term employment and that smart workers were perpetual free agents, always on the prowl for the next opportunity. The job had replaced the career. Jobs were always temporary,
even if they were not labeled that way explicitly.
But now the task may be replacing the job. “Job” implies an employer (often a corporation) and an employee. But platforms like Uber,
TaskRabbitt, and countless other “sharing economy” apps provide a
means to contract for specific tasks rather than hiring for jobs. Thanks to
ubiquitous smartphones, it is now possible to create markets (and therefore to discover prices) for all kinds of human tasks on all kinds of
schedules. Not all markets require prices—think Tinder and Grindr—but
at the moment, almost anything that can be provided by another human
being has an app for it operating in the Bay Area. This is the “gig economy,” or the “on-demand economy,” or the “TaskRabbit economy.”30 A
better term that remains agnostic about what is being provided via these
impromptu markets is platform capitalism, where platforms enable transactions.
Uberization renders the corporate employment relation increasingly
dispensable. Why do companies hire people in the first place? One rationale is that work requirements cannot always be specified in advance,
and so it pays to have employees on hand who are willing to do a broad
range of tasks more or less on demand. But this often requires firms to be
fully staffed even if the expected demand is not realized. The company
has to pay employees even if it doesn’t have anything for them to do,
which is an abomination for profit-driven firms. Recently, food service
and retail firms have been under fire for their erratic scheduling practices
that call in hourly employees for shifts and then send them home early if
there is not sufficient demand, or require them to be available for shifts
even though they might not get called in at all.31 The risk of variable
compensation week to week is borne by the employee, not the firm, and
is one of the common grievances of low-wage workers. Uber, in contrast,
does not have shifts. Its driver-partners are not required to work at any
30. Robert Kuttner, The Task Rabbit Economy, AM. PROSPECT, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 46, available at http://prospect.org/article/task-rabbit-economy.
31. Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workers-scheduling-hours.html; Noam
Scheiber, The Perils of Ever-Changing Work Schedules Extend to Children’s Well-Being, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/business/economy/the-perils-of-everchanging-work-schedules-extend-to-childrens-well-being.html; Noam Scheiber, Starbucks Falls
Short After Pledging Better Labor Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/business/starbucks-falls-short-after-pledging-better-laborpractices.html.
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particular time. They log in to the app on their phone and hang out an
electronic shingle. If an opportunity comes along, they can take it (and
get paid); if not, no one is to blame. If demand is expected to be high, as
on New Year’s Eve or when it is raining, they can receive surge pricing.
Pay is by the task, and there are no guarantees.
Now imagine an Ayn Rand world in which the employment relation
is on a “buyer beware” basis. Walmart or other employers could offer
training and certification for particular fungible tasks (cashier, shelf
stocker, greeter, returns clerk) and, using the hypothetical Walmart
YouServe app, recruit for the day or the hour as needed for each task.
Self-employed “quasi-associates” could log on to the app and bid on
shifts available at stores within a commutable distance for their certifications. If demand was high, the app might implement surge pricing; if not,
the quasi-associates might compete against each other to offer the low
price, everyday. Now, the hapless precariat has been transformed into a
nation of microentrepreneurs, seizing control of their own schedule and
charting their own destiny. Codependent no more!
The architecture for this enterprise of the future is already in place.
It is the enterprise as web page, in which the “firm” is a set of calls on
resources that are then assembled into a performance. Next time you are
on a web page, right-click and view the underlying source code. You will
see that what appears as a coherent design on your browser is actually
produced by a set of calls to various SQL databases and other sources.
The page you see does not exist until you call it into being. This may
sound abstract, but some familiar businesses already operate this way.
When Circuit City was liquidated in 2009 and its 34,000 remaining employees shown the door, a Long Island company bought the brand name,
logo, and web domain and connected it to an essentially automated order
fulfillment system.32 On the Web, it looked the same as it always did, but
behind the scenes in the physical world Circuit City was no more. Like a
hermit crab inhabiting a discarded shell, the new enterprise did what Circuit City did, without tangible real estate or human employees. The web
page was the enterprise.
Essential components of an enterprise have been available online
for years, but labor represents something different. It is possible to incorporate online,33 raise funds,34 hire programmers and other professionals,35
32. MSNBC, supra note 19; Miguel Bustillo, Web Breathes New Life Into Failed Retailers,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040590045751277
31650688968.
33. See, e.g., LIBERIAN CORPORATE REGISTRY, http://liberiancorporations.com/about-theregistry/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
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locate manufacturers36 and distributors,37 and almost any other task. Direct in-person labor was the one component of the enterprise that was
hard to make appear on demand. Thanks to Uberization, that is now possible. Like dockworkers on the waterfronts of old, or impromptu work
crews assembled in Home Depot parking lots at dawn, we now face the
prospect of a smartphone-enabled precariat scrambling for shifts on a
daily basis.
Moreover, as Oliver Williamson might have predicted, it is not the
level of skill but the firm-specificity of the skill that is likely to determine which jobs remain with employers and which become Uberized
tasks. Physicians are already doing on demand consults online during
their spare hours, including prescribing medicines.38 How much of what
a firm does could not be done by contractors in a pinch? How will organization design change so as to de-specify tasks and render them amenable
to Uberization?
CONCLUSION
Platform capitalism has received a great deal of attention in the
popular press and some in the academic literature. Here, I simply point
out its implications for the corporation. Put most simply, platforms greatly reduce the cost of using the price system, which was Coase’s rationale
for the firm in the first place. If long-lived investments are unnecessary
to do what a firm does because the inputs to production—including labor—can be rented on an ad hoc basis, then corporations will not be the
most cost-effective way to organize. This may help explain the declining
number of public corporations in the United States: the American economy is in the vanguard of implementing the “web page enterprise,”
which makes the corporation increasingly unnecessary.
We are used to talking about a world with “corporations” and “employees,” but that time is coming to a close. Our categories for apprehending the world do not map onto the world we encounter today. The
firm transformed from a social institution to a nexus-of-contracts, and is
now increasingly moving toward a web page enterprise. We may be at a

34. See, e.g., INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
35. See, e.g., UPWORK, https://www.upwork.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
36. See, e.g., ALIBABA, http://www.alibaba.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
37. See, e.g., SHIPWIRE, http://www.shipwire.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
38. Abby Goodnough, Modern Doctors’ House Calls: Skype Chat and Fast Diagnosis, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/health/modern-doctors-house-callsskype-chat-and-fast-diagnosis.html.
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point where traditional theories of corporate governance are more hindrance than help.

